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345 ____________________________________________________________________________________ term, full-time employment relationships was seen as a precondition for any attempt to ameliorate the problem of unemployment.
I then look at the idea of the labour exchange as a tool for organising the labour market in this way. Drawing on the ideas of British reformers such as William Beveridge, many in Australia saw the labour exchange as a key technology for achieving such organisation, but the evidence suggests that, in practice, State labour bureaux operating in this period failed to 'organise' the labour market around fulltime, permanent work. The idea of an 'organised' labour market, comprising a national pool of labour able to be directed to particular enterprises or industries, did, however, receive impetus under wartime regulations for the direction of labour and the establishment of the Manpower Directorate within the Department of Labour and National Service. It was this new body, with its network of National Service Offices, that would provide the administrative nucleus of the postwar CES. I examine this transition in the context of two key policy developments of the wartime period: the development of a national unemployment benefit scheme and the development of a full employment policy. I consider how the appropriate role of the CES in each instance was envisaged by policy makers, and how that role varied from the role of earlier state labour exchanges.
My final two sections examine the early operations of the new CES. This entails an examination, first, of the postwar labour market, in particular the displacement after World War II of forms of intermediate labour subcontracting, casual labour and so on, in favour of bureaucratically controlled, long-term employment relations. I suggest that this represented a development that was both juridical and socio-economic, a combination of regulatory intervention from arbitral courts and the development of large, vertically integrated enterprises concerned with the manufacture or delivery of standardised, generic products for mass markets in the context of a tight postwar labour market. In this context, labour management practices meant lack of work increasingly manifested itself not in casual or short-time work but in the more or less absolute inactivity of dismissed workers. Secondly, I explore the administrative arrangements around unemployment benefit and the 'work test' that tested claimants' job search activity by providing constantly updated information on vacancies and bringing this to bear on the case of each individual job seeker. In this way, the labour exchange rendered unemployment visible: the genuinely 'unemployed', temporarily and involuntarily out of work, could be distinguished from the 'malingerer'.
To sum up, then, I argue that although the actual role of labour exchanges in Australia has always been ambiguous or partial, reformers were correct in that only when the temporal and spatial dimensions of work were standardised in practice did 'unemployment' become a robust administrative and legal category. With this shift in the nature of the employment relationship, there emerged in Australia an idea of unemployment as involuntary inactivity caused by the loss of permanent or ongoing employment. By 1948 unemployment denoted a person severed from any connection with waged work and part of a national pool of labour available for, and seeking, fulltime work. This was a fundamentally different idea of unemployment than that which prevailed in, say, 1928 and probably 1938. The CES did not, on its own, create unemployment in this sense, but my examination of its foundation and early operations suggests that it was inexorably linked to these sorts of understandings and to the negotiation of the political and administrative limits to 'unemployment' within a particular labour market context.
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ In my conclusion, I offer some speculations on the implications of this historical examination for the analysis of current unemployment law and policy. If 'unemployment' is a contingent category that only consolidated itself slowly across the first half of the twentieth century, then it can be displaced by new discourses, programs and techniques for managing the workless. In this sense, it would appear that the eclipse of the CES marks more than a shift in administrative fashions. It is symptomatic of deeper shifts in policy makers' understandings of the labour market, the employment relationship and the problem of worklessness that have occurred in the three decades since Harris expressed such astonishment that employment services could be outsourced to religious organisations.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF CASUAL LABOUR
When, in 1928, Australia's newly established National Development and Migration Commission turned its inquiries to the issue of unemployment, it named the problem as one of labour market 'disorganisation' and spent large sections of its report discussing casual and irregular labour and the reform of hiring practices. 7 A Royal Commission on National Insurance had similarly concluded, a year earlier, that casual labour constituted 'the greatest problem in connexion with unemployment'. 8 This conflation of the problems of casual employment and unemployment was a common one, and consistent with a body of social and economic inquiry emerging from Britain in the last decade of the nineteenth century. William Walters argues that 'the casual labour problem marks the point at which the problems of poverty and pauperism begin to be linked to forms of employment', creating a space of inquiry where the links between labour markets, forms of employment and forms of social and moral life became established. 9 The preoccupation with casual labour was significant for two reasons. On the one hand it reflected the reality of emergent industrial labour markets which confounded any easy identification of the unemployed population and hence any attempt to ameliorate their position; on the other, it pointed to a social and administrative program in which the labour exchange would play a crucial role.
At the time of the Commission's investigations, rural employment, the meat and flour industries and building work in the construction industry were characterised by seasonal fluctuations; many collieries in the coal industry averaged less than four days work per week; the boot trade and textile industries relied extensively on short-time work and rostering; and continuous work in the steel industry was supplemented by casual employment of men seeking work gathered at the smelter gates. 10 This volatile labour market, based on the prevalence of small, technologically unsophisticated workplaces, operating on batch production, with seasonal instability in many industries, dated back to at least the late nineteenth century. Whereas some clerical and supervisory staff may have enjoyed ongoing employment, workers on the shop floor
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Inventing Unemployment 347 ____________________________________________________________________________________ tended to bear the brunt of fluctuations, with women and juveniles in particular providing a large pool of short-term, casual labour. 11 Large mass production firms remained the exception as the small domestic market limited economies of scale, resulting in a large number of small-scale producers. By the 1920s family-owned and managed firms still dominated the economy, with the average number of wage earners per establishment in Australia in 1929 only 15.6. 12 In any case, early factory production often merely brought under one roof artisans who continued to labour in a selfcontained way as contractors, 13 and the distinction between the 'inside worker' and the outworker was not clearly fixed. 14 Contracts for the supply of labour were often organised in such a way as to transfer the risk of shortage of work onto the worker through piece work arrangements, 15 or by characterising the work relationships as a leasing arrangement, 16 partnership 17 or a contract for purchase and sale. 18 The economy as a whole remained oriented predominantly toward primary production, with the rural sector providing 60 per cent of the national product even in the 1930s. This implied seasonal fluctuations as regards both the distribution and processing of a wide range of products.
The prevalence of casual work provoked a combination of moral and wider economic concerns. Weekly wages under an employment contract were seen by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court as not only better in terms of guaranteeing workers subsistence, but as tending to 'greater steadiness in the prosecution of the work required by the community.' 19 Casual work meant 'frequent bouts of idleness' that led not only to 'bad habits' but a 'tremendous waste of potential human energy'. 20 'The status of the citizen with no semblance of security in social life, hawking his labour for sale by the hour, is one of the greatest dangers of the present economic system.' 21 
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Under weekly wages the employee tends to identify himself with the particular undertaking, to feel interested in the concern, and it takes much more to induce him to throw up a job if it is constant. It is in the interest of the employers as well as in the interests of the employees that the employment should not be casual, that a man should not feel himself to be a piece of flotsam or jetsam in the industry-that he should have a sense of homeship in the concern. 22 However, the Commonwealth Arbitration Court was largely forced to accept a certain distribution of casual employment, and in those industries where the interruptions to work or the alternation of brisk and slack seasons were fairly predictable, or where idle workers were expected to hold themselves ready for work, the Court attempted to ameliorate its effects through loading a higher hourly rate for awards. In effect, higher payment in employment for these employees was an offset against periods of unemployment. 23 To some extent, the problem of casual labour would be eclipsed soon after the Development and Migration Commission delivered its report with the onset of the Depression and the emergence of a new phenomenon: that of the redundancy of permanent or core workforces, resulting in joblessness of extended duration. Yet various forms of underemployment persisted, with work rationing and short-time work a widespread response to the Depression. 24 In South Australia and Victoria the practice affected both public and private sectors, 25 and in New South Wales was utilised in the railways 26 and amongst miners. 27 As early as the 1920s vagaries of the clothing and furniture trades saw the Arbitration Court insert two days notice of termination provisions and 'turns' for employees in slack times which spread available work over the entire workforce. 28 More awards were modified to allow short-time work, 'turns' and rationing to accommodate the extreme economic troughs of the Depression. 29 
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Inventing Unemployment 349 ____________________________________________________________________________________ continued into the 1930s, even in larger enterprises. 31 It was common at the time for underemployment to be seen to some degree as normal and hence unremarkable. 32 For official commentators, the casual labourer who had been the centre of attention during the 1920s was displaced by the long-term claimant of emergency unemployment relief, yet this change of form in official preoccupation should not be taken as evidence for the disappearance of earlier employment practices. 33 The predominance of intermittent or fluctuating work impeded an easy differentiation of the unemployed from the employed. In colonial and Commonwealth censuses, the pre-eminent category was that of 'gainful worker', which had no temporal or strictly behavioural dimension: people recorded their usual occupation and may not have been working at their occupation on the day or week that the census count was taken. As a subset of this category, 'unemployment' remained an imprecise term and operated at various times as a descriptor of a wide array of labour market statuses and often included lack of work due to illness, accident, strike, lockout or old age. 34 Trade union returns as to numbers of members out of work offered an alternative source of statistics on unemployment. 35 Yet union understandings of unemployment were intimately tied up with the protection of trade practices and negotiated rates of pay. Unionists quit if an employer was in breach of workplace agreements and expected support from their union in such circumstances, while members looking for work were expected to refuse work with such employers and be supported as well. 
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Federal Law Review Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Similarly, an 'unemployed' union member on the books was not necessarily totally out of work, taking the odd casual job but on the understanding that it was not work 'in the trade', the search for which would still be supported. 36 Several Australian craft unions established 'out-of-work' funds in the late nineteenth century, where loss of work due to industrial disputation was fully supported, as was the case in the Australasian Society of Engineers 37 and in the plumbing, bootmaking, carpentry 38 and printing trades. 39 The possibility of support for 'out of work' members thereby exerted a trade union discipline over members who might otherwise have been prepared to work for less than union rates. The interpretation of trade union returns of unemployment is again complicated in those sectors where short-time work was a common method of managing fluctuating demand. This may lie behind the inclusion of 'part-time' and casual workers in New South Wales union returns. Overall, the 'unemployed' as measured by returns were hardly a uniform group, but varied according to industrial sector and trade practices within that sector. The connection between trade union 'unemployment' and the protection of trade practices was possibly one of the factors leading to official scepticism as to the worth of trade union unemployment returns. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth government had initially encouraged the collection of returns, by the late 1920s their reputation had fallen. 40 
THE LABOUR EXCHANGE SOLUTION
The Arbitration Court, through its casual loading, was recognised as providing compensation for some periods of unemployment, 41 but there appeared little the Court could do by way of prevention. Also, a trade depression, rather than the fairly predictable patterns of intermittency that characterised many industries, resulted in workers being dismissed until trade revived, with the Court in these circumstances refusing to adjust awards with loadings simply as a form of unemployment compensation. Loss of earnings in such cases, the Court thought, was a 'social injustice which [could] only be remedied by some form of unemployment insurance'. 42 Proposals for unemployment insurance schemes were leading to more sophisticated understandings of unemployment. In 1911, the Commonwealth government sent its Chief Statistician, G H Knibbs, on a study tour of Europe to look at social insurance schemes. He defined unemployment as 'involuntary idleness not due to physical disability, nor to degeneracy of will'. 43 Like any insurance scheme, it was _____________________________________________________________________________________ 36 Whiteside, above n 6, 52-3. 37 Sheridan, above n 30, 13; N G Butlin, 'An Index of Engineering Unemployment, 1852-1943' (1946) 
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351 ____________________________________________________________________________________ necessary to guard against the hazard of insuring people against events they could themselves wilfully cause -hence the emphasis on 'involuntary' idleness, although Knibbs had to concede that in many cases it 'is well nigh impossible to ascertain whether the unemployment is attributable to default on the part of the insured or not.' Such a question necessarily involved value judgements, as workmen could 'justly discard' employment if a situation arose whereby they had a 'moral right' to free themselves. Knibbs thereby preferred the term 'justifiable unemployment' rather than 'involuntary unemployment'. 44 Clearly, though, what trade unions, in defence of trade standards, thought was 'justifiable' unemployment could differ from economists, actuaries or administrators. Generally speaking, absences from work due to industrial dispute and voluntary quits would be excluded from the list of insurable risks. 45 In short, the close relationship which had existed between out-of-work benefits and trade union negotiating strategy would have to be weakened. 46 More clearly than census or trade union statistics, proposed insurance schemes attempted to identify unemployment as a particular risk to be understood as distinct from old age, industrial disputation, accident and sickness. In particular, unemployment insurance presumed unemployment was a condition distinct from employment. That is, it assumed a bipolar labour market, split between the 'employed' and the 'unemployed' with workers moving between the categories according to the prevailing level of economic activity. 47 Yet although an actuarial approach may have led to a fundamentally new understanding of unemployment, 48 the issue remained whether such an understanding could find purchase in the kind of heterogeneous labour market characteristic of pre-World War II Australia or whether it required a fundamental re-organisation of hiring practices.
Many saw the 'organisation' of the labour market as a precondition for any scheme of unemployment insurance. The National Development Commission pointed to the 'diversity of methods and agencies by which jobs are filled' as increasing the labour reserve and hence unemployment. The lack of co-ordination between government bureaux, trade union bureaux, privately controlled bureaux and more informal methods of recruitment tended 'to be confusing, inefficient, and wasteful ... and [to] contribute to the creation of numbers of separate reserves of labour within the respective industrial groups' and accounted for a considerable proportion of unemployment. 49 By contrast, a national uniform labour exchange could abolish the labour reserves of individual industries, concentrating them into one, as well as providing the information that would aid labour mobility and supervise and coordinate private agencies. 50 In this, it echoed the view put by the Royal Commission on 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ National Insurance, which argued that a system of employment bureaux was 'the indispensable basis for the foundations of an unemployment insurance scheme'. 51 The idea that labour exchanges could better organise the labour market can be found in earlier Australian public discourse in the 1890s. 52 These ideas echoed a strand of opinion that had emerged from Britain in the early decades of the century when a group of social and administrative reformers such as Charles Booth, Sidney and Beatrice Webb and, most famously, William Beveridge, promoted the idea of the labour exchange in an explicit attempt to decasualise the labour market. 53 These reformers first began to define unemployment as a social and administrative problem related to labour market organisation and separate from the cultural or moral interpretations associated with poverty or pauperism. They saw the appropriate response as the decasualisation of the labour market and the transfer of necessary workmen to regular, permanent employment. This would allow any superfluous population to be identified and then more easily policed according to the categories of deserving and undeserving poor: on the one hand, those capable of regular work and able to be absorbed into other industries; on the other, those who, in Booth's words, 'if the worst comes to the worst … pass through the workhouse and finally die'. 54 Beveridge thought a national network of labour exchanges could rationalise hiring procedures: 'For the man who wants to get a casual job now and again', explained Beveridge, 'the exchange will make that wish impossible … The result of the exchange is the direct opposite from that of assisting the lazy or incapable; it makes it harder for them and compels them to be regular'. 55 Echoing Booth, Beveridge saw labour exchanges as performing an implicitly moral function in separating the deserving and undeserving unemployed: they would 'enable the idle vagrant to be discovered unmistakably and sent to an institution for disciplinary detention'. 56 By decasualising and concentrating work on a restricted group of workers, the labour exchange program in effect constructed unemployment as absolute -and possibly prolonged -inactivity. 57 Decasualisation, 'in making work more regular for some … throws others out altogether. The fact is undeniable. The avowed object of decasualisation is to replace every thousand half-employed men by five hundred fullyemployed men.' 58 In short, labour exchanges were not seen as responding to the empirical reality of unemployment, but as constituting the very subject they sought to act upon. Classical economics presumed a fluid and frictionless labour market, tending toward an equilibrium of supply and demand, making 'involuntary' unemployment both a fairly transient and easily identifiable phenomenon. The problem for rational-minded 
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Inventing Unemployment 353 ____________________________________________________________________________________ reformers was that worklessness was not manifesting itself in this way. In Beveridge's admission, by concentrating in time and space the forces of supply and demand, 59 the labour exchange was one way 'of making reality correspond with the assumptions of economic theory'. 60 Linked was the idea of a system of unemployment insurance to sustain men during their period of unemployment. Here an equally innovative role for labour exchanges came to the fore: their operation as a system of social surveillance. The principle governing the Poor Laws had been a Benthamite one of deterrence or 'lesser eligibility', whereby the position of the pauper on relief was to be made less comfortable than that of the lowest paid labourer. The belief was that unless a worker was really unable to obtain work, they would not accept relief under such hard conditions. 61 The labour exchange presented an alternative: 'If all the jobs offering in a trade or a district are registered at a single office, then it is clear that any man who cannot get work through that office is unemployed against his will'. 62 The means by which the exchange would actually 'test' the unemployed would vary over time, ranging across formulae such as 'genuinely seeking work' and 'available for work'. 63 All these attempted to distinguish involuntary unemployment from a range of other labour market statuses. While insurance benefits would still be paid at a low rate relative to standard wages, there was less fear that rates and conditions of relief more generous than the Poor Laws would encourage idleness and malingering if a system of labour exchanges operated. As Mansfield concluded:
The labour exchange is supposed to be capable of so counterposing job-vacancies and the dossiers containing the qualifications of unemployed workers that it can identify individuals 'voluntarily' avoiding work, 'scrounging' or 'malingering' being phenomena created by the imposition of this form of surveillance. Indeed, the 'voluntarily unemployed' did not exist prior to the labour exchange. 64 Beveridge proved instrumental in having the Liberal government in Britain enact the Labour Exchange Act 1909, followed two years later by a scheme of unemployment insurance. It is doubtful whether the British exchanges really stopped the type of 'hawking' of labour that concerned Beveridge. 65 What is clear, though, is that the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 59 Walters, above n 53, 281. 60 Beveridge, above n 58, 237. The extent to which the reality of British industrial relations in the first decades of the twentieth century refused to conform to the economic theory embodied in the national labour exchange system is explored in Malcolm Mansfield, 'Flying to the Moon: Reconsidering the British Labour Exchange System in the Early Twentieth Century' (2001) 66 Labour History Review 24. 61 Beveridge, above n 58, 215. 62 Ibid. 63 Beveridge thought that the 'genuinely seeking work' test did not so much catch out the work-shy or malingering man as provide a weapon 'against claims by women who on marriage had practically retired from industry and were not wanted by employers, but tried not unnaturally to get something for nothing out of the fund'. Moreover, he saw the 'genuinely seeking work' formula as undermining his original plan for labour exchanges, as it would drive men back into the 'hawking of labour' and 'fruitless journeys' for work outside of the ambit of the exchange: ibid 280. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ contemporaneous development of State labour bureaux in Australia hardly reflected these concerns to 'organise the labour market'. Generally, early State labour exchanges in Australia were a response to the concentration of unemployed men in the major towns or cities and tended to operate 'more as a means of social control and as … charitable institution[s] than as … full scale labour exchange [s] .' 66 They typically registered men for temporary or casual work, principally as artisans and labourers on government works, but also sent men out to private employers seeking labour or provided the railway fare for men willing to leave urban centres in search of work. 67 Rather than decasualise the labour market, in many ways the government bureaux, with their emphasis on numbers of men 'sent out', became the headquarters of a mobile reserve of casual labour, suitable to volatile and seasonal conditions and the irregular demand for labour that characterised the colonial labour market. 68 The situation was exacerbated with the onset of the Depression of the 1930s. Registration or contact with State labour bureaux operated primarily as a precondition of receiving unemployment relief (that is, either relief work for wages or rations, or sustenance), 69 and only Queensland and New South Wales had well developed systems, operating on a decentralised basis, with considerable experience in both administering relief and in handling and placing labour. In other States, organisations to administer unemployment relief and sustenance that had expanded during the Depression years had, by the second half of the 1930s, gradually reverted to their preDepression size. 70 The situation changed markedly with the onset of World War II when the Commonwealth secured unprecedented control over matters of labour administration and the direction of manpower under its constitutional 'defence power'. 71 Australian Constitution s 51(vi) enabled the federal Parliament to enact any laws that had a real connection with the defence of the Commonwealth or which were associated with the prosecution of the war, greatly extending the valid scope of the federal Parliament's legislative power compared with peacetime.
Inventing Unemployment 355 ____________________________________________________________________________________ district and issued certificates of exemption from war service under the protected undertakings controls. As well as limiting the capacity of employers to dismiss labour without prior approval, national security regulations also made it compulsory for employers, both Government and private, to engage labour solely through the National Service Offices. 72 By March 1942 every unemployed person was required to register with their nearest National Service Office. 73 Wallace Wurth, Director-General of Manpower until late 1944, admitted there was always 'some doubt as to the precise meaning to be accorded to the word "unemployed"'. 74 This perhaps reflected the relatively underdeveloped nature of unemployment insurance schemes in Australia, but also the specific labour market demands of the War. The Directorate was less interested in those who were 'technically unemployed' than 'those who were not gainfully occupied, the latter group comprising relatively large numbers of females who were not actively seeking employment'. 75 The priority was to mobilise all available labour -that is, to efface any distinction between the 'technically unemployed' and those available for work more generally. 76 Wurth thought it was best to proceed by relying 'largely on the psychological effect of the existence of the regulation rather than on any strict legal interpretation of its provisions'. 77 The expansion of the armed forces on the one hand and the high wages and attractive conditions offered by the war industries on the other tended to minimise the number of unemployed registered at National Service Offices. Those people remaining who might be capable of direction to essential employment were selected from the civilian register and required to attend an interview at the National Service Office where they were offered a choice of several positions. Only if they did not voluntarily accept the employment offered was a direction issued. Between January 1942 and January 1946, an estimated three million people were placed in employment through the Offices, with directions issued to about 10 000. Appeals against a direction could be made to a magistrate. Appeals were made by around 100 directed persons and upheld in two-thirds of cases. 78
SOCIAL POLICY IN WARTIME
The eventual postwar transformation of the Manpower Directorate into the CES needs to be understood in relation to two major social policy developments of the wartime era: the development of a national unemployment benefit scheme and the development of a full employment policy. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Officials within Treasury used the occasion of a wartime Joint Committee on Social Security, established in 1941, to argue for a non-contributory unemployment benefit scheme, financed from a progressive income tax made possible by the Commonwealth's new position as the sole taxing authority in that field. 79 The resulting cash payment would be means tested and set at a flat rate considerably below prevailing wage rates. Treasury official Jim Nimmo thought the 'one important danger' in establishing a Commonwealth payment, even considerably below prevailing wage rates, was 'that it may weaken or destroy for many persons the incentive to work':
There is only one effective means to prevent malingering and that is by the application of a work test. Wherever a work test has been applied it has proved a most unpopular measure. Nevertheless it is an essential part of any scheme to guarantee a minimum income to able-bodied workers. 80 The necessity to apply a work test meant that the organisation responsible for the administration of any scheme must also act as an employment agency and that such an agency be most appropriately established within Labour and National Service. This would render State relief organisations and employment exchanges redundant. 81 The Third Report of the Joint Committee, published on 25 March 1942, affirmed the merits of a non-contributory, flat-rate scheme. The Committee's analysis of unemployment reiterated the concerns of the National Development and Migration Commission, suggesting that a system of 'employment exchanges under Commonwealth supervision are without doubt the most important and the most urgent reform required in the Australian system for the organisation of labour'. It recognised that the National Service Offices under the Directorate of Manpower provided the nucleus of 'an efficient system of employment exchanges which may be expanded to carry out any function associated with unemployment benefits' including the application of a work test, while also recognising that such a system would help in 'the placing of Australian labour to the best advantage'. 82 The 
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357 ____________________________________________________________________________________ test in particular was seen as fundamentally different from the type of administration already being undertaken by the Department of Social Services in regard to child endowment and widows' pensions, and Curtin, anxious to get the unemployment benefit scheme running by early 1945, favoured using the resources of the Manpower Directorate. 83 The Directorate was only too happy to claim the administration of unemployment benefits, not least because it strengthened the Directorate's prospects for surviving into the postwar period as a peacetime national employment service. By the end of 1944 William Funnell, who had succeeded Wurth as Director-General, had already informed his Deputy Directors-General in each State that the unemployment and sickness benefit scheme would come into force on 1 March the following year and that it seemed 'not unlikely that the actual administration of this scheme will devolve upon this Department'. 84 Here, however, the Directorate needed to tread a fine line: Funnell had reservations about tying the employment service too closely with administration of the Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act for fear of the service being seen as a dole and social security payment organisation rather than a generalist labour exchange. For political reasons, however, he thought it unwise in early 1945 'to dissociate the independent need for an Employment Service from the requirement of an organisation to handle administration of the [Unemployment and Sickness Benefits] Act'. 85 By February 1945 the Ministers of Labour and Social Service, together with their departmental heads, had reached an agreement that the Directorate of Manpower would administer the work test but play no part in policy formation surrounding unemployment benefits, which would be the sole responsibility of the Department of Social Service. 86 On 10 March Funnell was able to report to his deputies that Cabinet had approved the establishment, within Labour and National Service, of a Commonwealth Employment Service and that it would, inter alia, participate in the administration of the unemployment and sickness benefit scheme.
Across the second half of 1944 and into 1945, the Department of Postwar Reconstruction was also finalising the draft of a White Paper on Full Employment. In early drafts of the White Paper, the role of the labour exchange appeared peripheral to the main concerns of Postwar Reconstruction's economists and planners. For them, the pre-war understanding of unemployment as primarily a problem of rationalizing the market for labour by administrative means had been displaced by a macroeconomic understanding based around the management of public investment and consumer demand. 87 To the extent they turned their mind to the idea of the labour exchange, it was to recognise its more strictly economic role as a mechanism for reducing labour market 'frictions' by more quickly placing all grades of displaced labour. A draft of the White Paper circulated at the end of February 1945 proposed 'more adequate machinery for … job finding'. Achievement of full employment would only be practicable if every effort was made 'to increase the mobility of labour as between 
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ districts and between industries and occupations'. 88 But the kinds of state intervention that the Keynesian planners were pursuing were largely informed by quantitative analysis of spending, consumption and investment. Whether a lack of effective demand would manifest itself as the total inactivity of a few or the underemployment and irregular work of the many -the issue of labour market organisation that preoccupied Booth and Beveridge -was left unexamined.
Funnell, however, pushed for the Commonwealth Employment Service's functions to be given more prominence, suggesting 'a few cohesive paragraphs indicating the Government's intention to develop a high calibre Commonwealth-wide service … and the reasons why both sides of industry should cooperate to the full in achieving the government's object'. 89 The final version saw a stronger statement as to the continued postwar role of the new service than Coombs and others had originally envisaged. 90 The eventual prominence of the role of the CES in the final version of the White Paper suggests that, as Walters argues, the new Keynesian approach to securing full employment did not supplant the idea of the labour exchange but took shape alongside it. 91 If a labour exchange were to fulfil the ideal of organising the labour market around full-time contracts of permanent employment -the ideal of those social reformers discussed earlier -or even to meaningfully facilitate the mobility of labour as envisaged by the White Paper, it would need to exercise control over all or most labour hiring. Yet the White Paper had strongly leaned toward voluntarism in employers' use of the employment service in peacetime, making neither engagement of labour through the exchange nor even notification of vacancies by employers compulsory. Funnell, in contrast, had argued that wartime labour controls, or at least the 'power to control engagements of labour by certain industries or for employment in certain occupations', should not be immediately discarded at the close of hostilities, given the White Paper envisaged the maintenance of wartime controls over prices and private (1945) . The proposed Employment Service was given eight paragraphs under the subheading 'Mobility of Resources'. Paragraph 59 made the kind of categorical statement that Funnell was after, referring to the government's commitment to building a 'thoroughly efficient service' staffed by 'suitably qualified and experienced personnel' using the 'best modern practice in placement, training and vocational guidance'. The government wished to make it clear 'that no effort will be spared in building a service of the highest quality in both its personnel and procedures, and accordingly invites both employers and employees to collaborate in ensuring its success'. 91 Walters, above n 9, 103. Writing in the mid-1940s, Beveridge admitted that his earlier writings on the role of labour exchanges in alleviating unemployment had ignored the question of aggregate demand -a position 'in accord with all academic economists and most practical men' of the time. In the wake of the Keynesian revolution, he now insisted that his and Keynes' approaches were complementary rather than in opposition: William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (1944) 106-107.
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Inventing Unemployment 359 ____________________________________________________________________________________ overseas transactions. 92 Postwar Reconstruction, in contrast, thought the government should merely state its intention 'to build up a thoroughly efficient and up-to-date service, which by its very quality can gain and hold a sufficiently influential position in the labour market'. 93 Such a service would 'attract employers by convincing them that better results in securing personnel for their requirements can be achieved through the employment service than by their own uncoordinated separate and individual advertising or selection from gate pick-ups'. 94 In May 1945, in a further attempt to secure a de facto monopoly over placement for the Service, Henry Bland of Labour and National Service suggested to Postwar Reconstruction they insert in the Re-establishment and Employment Bill a power to prevent private fee-charging employment agencies operating. He thought the basis for such legislation could be found in the recommendations of the ILO on the subject and the Commonwealth's external affairs power. 95 The issue hinged on whether the external affairs power could give the Commonwealth a constitutional mandate to pass such legislation, that is, whether it allowed not just for the ratification of international conventions but also their implementation by the Commonwealth, even where the subject matter was normally constitutionally reserved to the States. There were differences of opinion on the matter and the parliamentary draftsman was loath to place such a provision in a Bill without further investigation and discussion with the Attorney-General. By February the following year, the government had virtually conceded, on the advice of Professor Kenneth Bailey, that the High Court 'would reject any contention that the external affairs power gives complete legislative coverage'. 96
THE CES IN THE POSTWAR LABOUR MARKET
The CES was established under the Re-establishment and Employment Act 1945 (Cth) and commenced operations in May 1946. The government's commitment to voluntarism meant that any labour market power the new CES wished to claim would have to be won by carving out a market share in competition with other labour market intermediaries. The CES could draw on the expertise of the Directorate of Manpower which had vastly extended its capabilities and expertise during the War. However, the Directorate had proven one of the more unpopular agencies of the war and so the CES, as successor to the Directorate, started with a 'strong public relations handicap'. 97 The CES was able, at least, to mobilise the ethos of postwar reconstruction and appeals were made to the goodwill of employers to hire ex-servicemen through the Service. At 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the same time, press comment on the new service was largely positive, with some praising it precisely because of the lack of compulsion involved. 98 Case studies and testimonials of successfully placed employees also featured in Pix and Women's Weekly. Trade unionists did not have the same misgivings about the wartime direction of labour as many employers, as they had found their labour market position considerably enhanced under wartime conditions. Guy Anderson, a member of the ACTU executive, wrote a piece on 'The Benefits of the CES to the Trade Unionist' which he authorised Labour and National Service to use as it saw fit for the purposes of publicity. In it, he contrasted the 'old scramble for jobs … and much time tramping from job to job' that existed prior to the war and contrasted this with the wartime arrangement of registering with National Service Offices, an arrangement whereby 'the unsatisfactory prewar features of the engagement of labour were largely eliminated'. The CES would replicate this efficiency in job search. Anderson concluded: 'My experience is that the happiest person in the community is the man who is employed on congenial work in keeping with his ability, whilst the most dissatisfied person is one who follows the job, hangs around the factory gates, and is unable to gain suitable employment … Unionists, the CES is a free service-use it in your own interests'. 99 Anderson's touchstone was a pre-war labour market but, in fact, forms of intermediate labour subcontracting, casual labour and so on, were being progressively displaced by the 1940s in favour of long-term employment relations. This was partly the result of collective bargaining and the intervention of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. By interpreting its mandate as one to regulate relations between capital and labour more widely, the Court managed to regulate by indirect means the wages and conditions of some of those work relationships that stood outside the employment contract. 100 The regulation of subcontracting in clothing and textiles was specifically addressed with an award in 1937. 101 By integrating increasing numbers of workers into established wage-fixing procedures, the attractiveness to employers of various sub-contracting arrangements and forms of labour hire outside of the employment relationship was weakened.
Also, where the Court judged the 'normal conditions' of work to be regular and continuous rather than seasonal or subject to fluctuation, the Court moved to a policy of weekly hiring. 102 Weekly hiring clauses meant employees were engaged full-time from week to week, with payment for public holidays and absence from work on account of ill health for up to six days per year, and employment terminable by a week's notice on either side. Where circumstances beyond the employer's control -in particular strikes, but also physical mishaps -meant interruptions to production, 
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Inventing Unemployment 361 ____________________________________________________________________________________ employers were given the benefit of 'standdown clauses'. 103 However, the Court tended to interpret stand down clauses strictly so as to not undermine the security provided by weekly hiring and standdowns could not be used simply to create shorttime work during slack periods. 104 By the late 1920s weekly hiring applied to core workforces comprising blacksmiths, engineers, carpenters and joiners in shops, coopers, wool workers, manufacturing grocers' employees, timber workers, furniture trades employees, liquor and allied trades employees, storemen and packers and workers in the printing industry, clothing industry, meat industry and food preserving industry. 105 Weekly hiring and the limits on standdown came to signify a kind of 'permanent' or open-ended employment, but also meant that termination of an employee with a week's notice was, in principle, the mandated way of dealing with slack periods rather than placing him or her on short-time. In practice, however, we have seen that short-time work remained widespread in the interwar years and in some sectors was explicitly authorised in awards.
The need to rationalise production and limit absenteeism and turnover during World War II, and acute labour shortages after the War, meant that labour management practices changed markedly during the 1940s. 106 The offer of long-term stable employment, greater job security, rewards for seniority, common enterprise policies with company-wide job descriptions and procedures, formalised work rules and pay scales and centralised personnel departments that regularised both external hiring and internal promotion, were seen as ways to attract and retain all grades of labour and to reduce industrial unrest resulting from trade unions' increased bargaining power and became generalised from the late 1940s onwards. 107 Impersonal work rules tended to suit a labour process -both manual and clerical -increasingly routinised around rationalised 'work stations', substitutable as between one worker and another. In the context of new mass markets for generic, standardised products, short-term fluctuations could be managed through the build-up of inventory; in the case of more severe fluctuations those older forms of labour management, such as work-rationing, the hiring and discharge of casual labour, and wage rate adjustments became harder to implement. Adjustments to fluctuations now tended to take place around the number of 'work stations' occupied, and downturn was managed primarily through redundancy. That is, while many personnel management functions and labour
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ transactions were internalised, ultimately more severe fluctuations were externalised through the dismissal of workers and the severance of the employment contract. 108 In retrospect, it is difficult to establish exactly what share of the placement market the CES captured in the immediate postwar period. The 1928 Report of the Development and Migration Commission had pinpointed 'diverse arrangements for the filling of vacancies' as contributing to labour market disorganisation, listing private employment agencies, trade unions and State labour exchanges. Although the CES clearly displaced the State exchanges, it is unclear to what extent its operations displaced other arrangements. In 1960, the Victorian State government removed any licensing controls over private bureaux on the grounds that the existence of the CES meant few manual workers -the beneficiaries of the original licensing laws -were making use of such agencies. 109 The continued existence of licensing arrangements for private bureaux in several other States, however, suggests that although the activities of private agencies had been greatly constrained by the National Security (Manpower) regulations during the war, they had regained some influence in the postwar labour market. Similarly, the use of trade unions as de facto placement agencies persisted in certain industry sectors in the postwar period. Up to the mid-1950s there is evidence of trade unions being used as labour suppliers in furniture and liquor trades, in coal and metal mining, shearing and the motor vehicle industry. 110 A survey of 156 factories, employing a total of 85 000 workers, conducted in the early 1950s, listed the CES as among the most common means of recruiting labour, along with advertisements in the metropolitan press, the recommendations of serving employees, and trade union contacts. While it found that some employers relied exclusively on the CES, it also 
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Inventing Unemployment 363 ____________________________________________________________________________________ observed that '[f]actories which recruited little labour and wanted mainly skilled tradesmen or employees with particular skills often relied solely on union contacts'. 111 There are two areas where the CES did exercise considerable influence in placing labour. The first was with newly arrived immigrants, the second, examined in the following section, with those claiming unemployment benefits. 112 The CES's role in the immigration program consisted of, first, providing some of the labour market information to assist the government in setting its annual intake target and, secondly, interviewing immigrants on disembarkation and attempting to match them with the existing demand for labour, as well as providing transport to places of employment once placement had been finalised. 113 CES officers were under instruction not to place newly arrived immigrants in employment for which suitable Australian workers were available or into situations that would lead to the displacement of Australian workers, and to ensure the immigrants would be employed under conditions whereby they would receive not less than award rates and enjoy the same terms as would Australian workers undertaking the same work. 114 In this way, the CES played an important part in policing the conditions of newly arrived immigrants' employment so as to blunt the competitive edge that this influx of labour would have had against the domestic workforce.
DEFINING UNEMPLOYMENT: THE WORK TEST IN THE POST WAR PERIOD
As noted, the preoccupation of prewar social administrators with organising the labour market so as to clarify the boundary between employment and unemployment appears to have been largely eclipsed in the White Paper. Where that earlier concern survived, however, was in the role the CES secured in administering a work test for a new system of unemployment benefits. Here, the emphasis would reflect the concern of earlier insurance-based schemes of relief in drawing distinctions between the genuinely unemployed and the malingerer.
Section 15(c)(ii) and (iii) of the Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act 1944 (Cth) required that the Director-General of Social Services satisfy himself that a claimant for unemployment benefit was 'capable of undertaking and willing to undertake work which, in the opinion of the Director-General, is suitable to be undertaken by that person' and that the claimant had 'taken reasonable steps to obtain such work'. Section 28 of the Act empowered the Director-General to postpone or cancel the payment of benefit if a claimant had become 'voluntarily unemployed without good reason'; had become 'unemployed by reason of misconduct'; had 'failed or refused without good and sufficient reason to accept an offer of employment which the Director-General 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ considers to be suitable'. The administrative procedures intended to ensure claimants met the requirements of ss 15(c) and 28 were referred to as the 'work test' or sometimes as the 'works test'. 115 The test echoed Beveridge's concern to weed out the malingerer -not by the principle of 'lesser eligibility', but by a system of administrative surveillance that only the labour exchange made possible. Australia's old age and disability pensions legislation reflected a similar concern with a claimant's responsibility for his or her current circumstances and their continuation, disqualifying those claimants for invalid pension, for example, whose incapacity was self-induced 'with a view to obtaining a pension'. 116 Similarly, the administration of emergency unemployment relief during the Depression incorporated a set of conditions that disqualified claimants who had refused offers of work 'without reasonable excuse'. 117 In December 1945, federal Cabinet considered administration of the work test formula. Holloway, the Minister for Labour and National Service, and Keane, Acting Minister for Health and Social Services recognised that, up to this point, unemployment had been negligible, but cited evidence of an increase in local unemployment in some districts: approaching seasonal slackness in those districts where seasonal industries predominated, such as the north Queensland meat and sugar industries; a diminution of job prospects in certain trades; and a disinclination by workers to accept available employment less attractive than that to which they had become accustomed during the war.
What was sought was a precise work test formula 'consistent with the government's policy of creating conditions designed to secure a high and stable level of employment' and with 'the Government's conception of social justice' but nevertheless avoiding 'abuse of a social service and consequent heavy expenditure from the National Welfare Fund' and not jeopardising the planned national works program due to lack of workers prepared to be geographically mobile. Holloway and Keane warned that any formula that allowed able-bodied persons to receive benefit while vacancies for suitable work waited to be filled would not only be inconsistent with these principles but 'would have a profound effect on the social structure'. 118 Cabinet resolved that all applicants for benefit would be required to register with the CES and to accept any suitable work available which may be offered to them. Failure to accept such work would render them ineligible for benefit. Much hinged, then, on the understanding of what counted as 'suitable' work. Employment which was not covered by an award or collective agreement was not considered suitable unless it carried remuneration at least equivalent to the recognised rate. Inventing Unemployment 365 ____________________________________________________________________________________ dependent children, claimants residing with a pregnant wife or claimants who were themselves pregnant were able to refuse employment which would involve living away from home, unless they were accustomed to undertaking such employment, and all claimants were entitled to refuse work that involved living away from home where the 'conditions and amenities' did not reach the standards usually applying to that type of employment. However, claimants would be disqualified where work was not available of the type for which they possessed particular experience or qualifications, or for which they had indicated a personal preference, and the claimant had refused to accept other employment which the district employment office considered suitable, even should such employment require working outside a trade calling or transfer of union membership. 119 In March 1945 Funnell, in his communications with Postwar Reconstruction over the drafting of the White Paper, had already recognised the different set of demands that would confront manpower planning in peace time. These included the problem of getting workers to accept 'uncongenial employment'; that of inducing workers to engage in public works in remote locations, and the 'social and industrial difficulties of obtaining a satisfactory balance between male and female employment'. 120 The administration of the work test attempted to surmount these problems, although the importation of single, immigrant workers, able to be directed into employment, was also no doubt seen by government as one possible response to these concerns. Yet the shift in concerns from those of the wartime Manpower Directorate to the new CES illustrates just how contingent notions of 'unemployment' are. 121 As discussed above, during the Pacific War the government was less concerned with 'technical' unemployment as with the mobilisation of all possible reserves of labour. This entailed, principally, the registration and potential direction of 'economically inactive' prime age women. In the postwar period, however, the work test embedded an activity-based or behavioural concept based on the taking of reasonable steps to obtain suitable work. This also entailed a redefinition of unemployment that reinforced the role of men as breadwinners. The Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act debarred married women claiming unemployment benefit in their own right if a husband was capable of maintaining them, and the CES's administration of the work test meant that the direction of labour -or, rather, of Australian-born labour -for the purposes of national development schemes was subordinated to keeping the family unit together. The influx of women into the labour force during the war years, actively encouraged by the Manpower Directorate, was now pinpointed by Labour and National Service as a labour market problem. In peacetime, it became difficult for the workless married woman to be 'unemployed'.
As indicated by Holloway and Keane's submission to Cabinet, the work test attempted to inculcate an industrial discipline appropriate to a specific labour market and social context. That context included the drive for national development, along with a tight labour market and enhanced worker bargaining power. But it also 
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ included certain labour standards -the prevalence of award rates -and certain social mores -particularly the value placed on preservation of 'home' life for the traditional family unit. In this way, involuntary unemployment can be seen as a social and cultural practice and norm in part constituted by Australia's prevailing system of labour regulation. 122 That is, unemployment did not refer to an inability to find any work but an inability to find work under conditions laid down by regulation. The idea of 'involuntary' unemployment therefore clearly still embodied a right to refuse work under certain conditions. However, whereas trade union out-of-work schemes made it possible for an unemployed person to hold out for a job in their own occupation or trade, under customary conditions, the work test in Australia meant the unemployed could be directed to take up work outside their usual trade, rather than being supported while waiting for 'better' work to show up. 123 Again, this represents a shift from the notion of stable occupation embodied in the 'gainful employment' approach of prewar censuses, to a more generic understanding of work, characteristic of the new, emerging labour practices and an extensive system of labour regulations and standards. The work test reconstructed the job search from one of looking for work 'in the trade' to a more generic search for 'work' per se. The prevalence of a national system of labour regulation, rather than, say, locally bargained collective agreements, also meant that workers could be more easily expected to be mobile across the uniform space of a protected, national labour market in their search for work. At the same time, the scope of the job search was limited in geographic terms for certain classes of workers -suggesting workers were not seen solely as interchangeable units of labour power, but were also conceived of as constrained by social context, particularly the demands of family life.
The other key site where the CES's ability to 'direct' or recruit labour intersected with traditional labour relations concerns was in the area of industrial disputes. A noteworthy characteristic of trade union out-of-work benefits was the practice of giving financial support to workers engaged in trade disputes. This was not carried over into the new unemployment benefit scheme. Section 15(c)(i) of the Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act required the Director-General of Social Services to be satisfied that a claimant's unemployment was not due to direct participation in a strike. How the CES chose to administer the disqualification was important as again it represented a negotiation of an important aspect of the immediate postwar labour market which _____________________________________________________________________________________ 122 Cf Walters, above n 9, 64. 123 As Funnell put it in a letter responding to a query from MP Eddie Ward in December 1946, the result of Cabinet's approval of the work test formula (as subsequently incorporated into the 1949 Manual) was that 'a tradesman may be offered a job as a labourer if better paid employment is not available and he is not allowed Benefit if he declines to accept this position, provided the Registrar considers he is capable of undertaking labouring work'. In practice, though, there was still room for discretion at the branch office level as to directing unemployed workers to take up work outside their trade. In February 1952 opposition leader H V Evatt pointed out in correspondence to the then Minister of Labour and National Service, Harold Holt, that some CES officers would apply this aspect of the work test 'most ruthlessly. Others are more humane and will readily endorse the claim form "No suitable employment available". The latter, I would say are a minority'. Holt replied merely by referring to the District Office Manual as authority for the notion that the unemployed must in the last resort be prepared to accept any job on offer, subject to the qualifications outlined: National Archives of Australia, Series MP537/1, Item No 251/57/2, 'Unemployment and Sickness Benefits: Application of the Works Test 1946-1952'.
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ a position vacated by a striking worker. Conversely, striking workers themselves would not be paid benefit, in accordance with s 15(c)(i). 128 The question was complicated where a union called out certain 'key men' with the intention of paralysing an enterprise and resulting in the stand down of practically all employees. The payment of unemployment benefit to all the men stood down would mean the government was 'being forced into the position of financing a strike … If the Government concedes the right of the Union to call one or two members out on strike and pay Unemployment Benefit to all other members of the Union when they cease work, it would appear that the temptation to enforce industrial disputes by a powerful union will be considerably encouraged'. 129 In the wake of a paralysing 'key man' strike called by the Federated Ironworkers Association ('FIA') in March 1946, a sub-committee of Cabinet thought the issue best addressed by amending s 15 of the Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act whereby a worker would be disqualified from benefit if he or she were 'one of a class or body of employees', any of the members of which were direct participants in a strike, at the establishment at which that person is employed, which resulted in the unemployment of that person. At the same time, the proposed amendment would insert a specific clause stating that a person would not be disqualified from receiving benefit 'by reason only of his refusal to undertake work which has become available by reason of a strike' or lockout. In short, Cabinet believed the first proposal would deal with the FIA tactics, while the second would incorporate the principle 'approved by the Government when the Bill was before Parliament, to ensure that a person would not be deprived of benefit solely because he would not act as a strike breaker'. 130 Holloway, the Minister for Labour and National Service, opposed the amendment, but ultimately similar proposals became incorporated into social service practice when a Cabinet subcommittee again considered the issue in April 1947. The following year a ministerial direction to the Department of Social Services noted that trade unions had been represented at a conference with the Minister and all had 'accepted the principle that the Commonwealth could not permit unemployment benefit to be used for financing strikes'. Apart from this, the union deputation had been informed by the Minister that 'no hard and fast rule should be laid down to cover cases where a strike of key worker unionists in one industry threw out of work members of the same union in another industry but that all the circumstances would have to be taken into account', including the conduct of the union and its executive. 131 Another complication arose where a union imposed a black ban on certain work or where a 'go-slow' had been imposed. In late 1946, the Department of Social Services decided that workers stood down for adopting 'go slow' tactics 'were to be adjudged
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369 ____________________________________________________________________________________ guilty of misconduct as workers and have payment of [unemployment] benefit postponed'. Further, the postponement was to continue as long as the work from which they had been stood down remained available to them should they be prepared to work at the normal rate. 132 That is, Social Services wanted the work test administered in such a way that workers would only be offered their old job and, on refusal, be denied benefit. Funnell objected, suggesting to the Director-General of Social Services that such an approach appears to indicate some misapprehension on the part of your officers … as to responsibility for application of the Works test and, apart from that, an attitude which, in my opinion, should not under any circumstances prevail.
[T]he practice is to offer an applicant any work available consistent with his qualifications, experience, etc, ie, the offer is not limited to one particular job, but is extended to all suitable vacancies. Only if the applicant refuses to accept, without good and sufficient reason, such offers of employment does the question of penalty (ie, postponement etc) arise. 133 The conflict presaged a more fundamental tension between the CES's work as a generalist placement agency and its role in administering a variety of welfare benefit. 134 Funnell was eager that the Service operate on the basis that informed effective placement services worldwide: 'the referral to vacancies of only those applicants who are judged suitable, having regard to the employer's specifications for the vacancy'. 135 Any failure to do this would bring 'disaster' to the CES, with the loss of confidence of employers using the Service and the progressive reduction in the number of vacancies notified to the Service. In short, it was vital that the CES avoid pressure from Social Services to apply the work test 'too much with a desire to reduce the number on benefit and at risk to the basic principle' enunciated above. 136 Although, as we have seen, Funnell had used the need for a work test to argue for the establishment of a peacetime employment service, once the service was in operation he clearly thought the work test, as a mode of surveillance for eligibility to unemployment benefit, should be subordinated to the general labour market functions of the CES.
CONCLUSION: THE END OF UNEMPLOYMENT?
The CES commenced operations in a labour market that was radically different from that of the prewar period, and its work would help to define both the boundaries between 'employment' and 'unemployment' and the nature of legitimate job search. In doing so, it reflected a new, mid-century understanding of employment relationships and a national labour market characterised by a system of uniform regulation and increasingly homogenised or generic work practices based around the open-ended or
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ line between involuntary unemployment and non-employment on the one hand, and that between 'welfare' and 'work' on the other, are blurred.
Space does not permit a full teasing out of the implications of these changes, 147 but, arguably, the story of welfare reform over the past couple of decades is one where unemployment has lost its 'formal centrality' and new modes of economic inactivity have taken over 'some of the regulatory work previously done by unemployment'. 148 This may indicate a return to earlier patterns of labour market organisation, whereby it is again difficult to distinguish between the unemployed worker and the intermittent or casual worker. Yet the current policy response represents a noteworthy and ironic departure. If for Booth and Beveridge, this type of underemployment bred unemployability, the administration and incentive structure around unemployment benefits has now been explicitly turned around 'to foster the type of labour market [Beveridge] 
